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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has reshaped the demand for goods and services
worldwide. The combination of a public health emergency, economic distress, and
misinformation-driven panic have pushed customers and vendors towards the
shadow economy. In particular, dark web marketplaces (DWMs), commercial websites
accessible via free software, have gained significant popularity. Here, we analyse
851,199 listings extracted from 30 DWMs between January 1, 2020 and November 16,
2020. We identify 788 listings directly related to COVID-19 products and monitor the
temporal evolution of product categories including Personal Protective Equipment
(PPE),medicines (e.g., hydroxyclorochine), andmedical frauds. Finally, we compare
trends in their temporal evolution with variations in public attention, as measured by
Twitter posts and Wikipedia page visits. We reveal how the online shadow economy
has evolved during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight the importance of a
continuous monitoring of DWMs, especially now that real vaccines are available and
in short supply. We anticipate our analysis will be of interest both to researchers and
public agencies focused on the protection of public health.
Keywords: COVID-19; Dark Web Marketplaces; Shadow economy; Bitcoin
1 Introduction
COVID-19 gained global attention when China suddenly quarantined the city of Wuhan
on January 23, 2020 [1]. Declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March
11, 2020, at the moment of writing the virus has infected more than 62,000,000 people and
caused over 1,450,000 deaths worldwide [2]. Measures such as social distancing, quaran-
tine, travel restrictions, testing, and contact tracing have proven vital to containing the
COVID-19 pandemic [3].
Restrictions have shaken the global economy and reshaped the demand for goods and
services worldwide, with an estimated 2.5–3% world GDP loss since the crisis started [4].
Demand for many products has fallen; for example, the price of Brent crude oil decreased
from 68.90 USD a barrel on January 1, 2020 to 43.52 USD as of August 2, 2020 [5, 6]. Mean-
while demand for other products, such as toilet paper [7], dramatically increased. As a re-
sult of increased demand, some products have been in short supply. Individual protective
masks were sold in the United States at 7 USD on February 2, 2020 [8] and the price of
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alcohol disinfectant doubled on July 1, 2020 in Japan [9]. Additionally, anti-gouging regu-
lations were introduced to control prices, which significantly affected the public attention
on products related to COVID-19 [10]. As this trend has continued, further exacerbated
by online misinformation, numerous customers have sought to fulfill their needs through
illicit online channels [11, 12].
Dark web marketplaces (DWMs) offer access to the shadow economy via specialized
browsers, like Tor [13]. DWMs offer a variety of goods including drugs, firearms, credit
cards, and fake IDs [14]. The most popular currency on DWMs is Bitcoin [15], but other
cryptocurrencies are accepted for payment as well. The first modern DWM was the Silk
Road, launched in 2011 [16] and shut down by the FBI [17] in 2013. Since then, dozens
more DWMs have sprung up and many have shut down due to police action, hacks, or
scams. Today, DWMs form an ecosystem [18] that has proven extremely resilient to law-
enforcement. Whenever a DWM is shut down, users swiftly migrate to alternative active
DWM and the economic activity recovers within a matter of days [19].
Researchers have studied DWMs since the emergence of Silk Road [16], through a se-
ries of case studies [20–22], and comparative analyses [23–28]. Past efforts have mostly
focused on specific goods, such as drugs or digital products [29]. However, these studies
experienced technical difficulties in data collection preventing researchers from analysing
a large and up-to-date dataset. As a result, several questions remain open, among which
are:
• how do DWMs react to sudden shocks (e.g., shortages) in the traditional economy?
• how do DWMs respond to trends in public attention?
In this study, we address these questions by analysing a new, large, and up-to-date
dataset. We studied 851,199 listings extracted from 30 DWMs between January 1, 2020
and November 16, 2020, right before the first worldwide vaccination campaign started
in the United Kingdom [30]. We identify 788 COVID-19 specific listings that range
from protective masks [31] to hydroxychloroquine medicine [32]. These listings were ob-
served 9464 times during this period, allowing us to investigate their temporal evolution.
We compare this COVID-19 related shadow economy with public attention measured
through Twitter posts (tweets) [33] and Wikipedia page visits [34]. Finally, we inspect list-
ings that mentioned delays in shipping or sales because of COVID-19. We significantly
extend previous analyses that surveyed 222 COVID-19 specific listings extracted from 20
DWMs on a single day (April 3, 2020) [35] and, to the best of our knowledge, offer the
most comprehensive overview of the DWM activity generated by the ongoing pandemic.
We found that DWMs promptly respond to signals coming from the traditional econ-
omy, increasing or decreasing the supply of goods according to their availability on reg-
ulated markets. For example, protective masks appeared in DWMs in March, when they
were in short supply in the regulated economy, and became more scarce on DWMs later
on when masks could be easily bought in shops. We also found that DWMs swiftly re-
act to changes in public attention as measured through Twitter posts and Wikipedia page
views. Finally, we registered spikes in the number of listings mentioning COVID-19 in
correspondence with lockdown measures in March and October. Our results are of inter-
est to different audiences: the academic community may further explore the behaviour of
DWMs in relation to social changes. Policy makers can better understand the effects that
new legislation have in the shadow economy. Practitioners may learn that DWMs posit
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additional threats to public health. A finding especially important due to the production
of COVID-19 vaccines.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In the Background Section, we introduce
DWMs with a brief overview of their history. In the Data Section, we explain how we
obtained our DWMs, Twitter, and Wikipedia datasets. The main outcomes of our work
are presented in the Results Section, while in the Discussion Section we compare them
with the established technical literature. Finally, in the Conclusion Section, we highlight
the contributions of our work that are relevant to different audiences as well as future
research developments.
2 Background: dark web marketplaces
The online shadow economy is as old as the Internet. The first reported illegal online
deal involved drugs and took place in 1972 [36]. The World Wide Web [37] facilitated
the emergence of online illicit marketplaces [38, 39] but the first marketplaces could not
guarantee anonymity and therefore permitted the traceability of users by law enforcement
[40].
Modern DWMs originated and still operate online, but outside the World Wide Web in
an encrypted part of the Internet whose contents are often not indexed by standard web
search-engines [41]. Silk Road marketplace, which launched in 2011, was the first mod-
ern DWM [16]. It proposed a new way of trading drugs and other illegal products online
and anonymously [23–25]. There were two key ingredients of Silk Road’s success. First,
potential customers could access it using the Tor browser [13], which made their trace-
ability difficult. Second, purchases were made in Bitcoin [15], which provided a degree of
privacy to buyers and sellers [29, 42, 43]. After the FBI shut down Silk Road in 2013 [17],
new DWMs quickly appeared, offering drugs, firearms, credit cards, and fake IDs [14].
These DWMs also adapted to further increase the level of privacy and security offered
to users [20, 21], such as the Invisible Internet Project (I2P) [44] and escrow checkout
services [45]. Tor, now available for mobile devices as well, still offers more privacy than
many other popular mobile applications [46] and Bitcoin is currently the most popular
cryptocurrency in DWMs [47–49].
Trade today on DWMs is worth at least several hundreds of millions of USD per year,
and involves hundreds of thousands of buyers and vendors [17–19, 50–52]. As a result,
law enforcement agencies have put considerable effort into combating DWMs [17, 51, 52].
Furthermore, DWMs have been targets of cybercriminal actors through use of distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and hacking attempts, while some DWMs also shut
down due to administrators stealing funds from customers directly [53, 54]. However,
DWMs have organised into a robust ecosystem which has proven exceptionally resilient
to closures and whenever a DWM is closed, the users trading higher volumes of Bitcoins
migrate to active DWMs or establish new ones [19].
The resilience and functioning operations of modern DWMs are possible partially be-
cause of numerous websites and forums where users can share their experiences. One ex-
ample is Dread [55], a Reddit-like forum created in 2018 after the closure of the dedicated
pages on Reddit [56]. Other ad-hoc platforms exist to monitor whether known DWMs are
active or currently unavailable [57–60]. Additional mechanisms, like feedback and ratings
systems [18], enhance the resilience of these DWMs and build trust towards the DWM and
its vendors. In a similar way to regulated online marketplaces, DWM buyers are asked to
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leave feedback and a rating after a purchase. Additionally, DWM administrators often act
as vendor moderators by banning vendors or specific categories of products. Some ex-
amples of this are DarkBay, where banned categories include human trafficking, contract
killing and weapons [61], and Monopoly marketplace, where COVID-19 fake vaccine list-
ings were recently banned by moderators [62].
DWMs have been used to circumvent laws and regulations. They have been the subject
of many case studies [20–22] and comparative analyses [23–28]. These studies highlighted
that illicit online transactions in DWMs are perceived as safer than negotiating in face-to-
face drug markets [20]. They are based on the concept of “harm reduction,” where vendors
prefer to sell tested and high-quality products [21]. Although DWMs form an online com-
munity, they are made unstable by their profit-based mentality of capitalism [22]. Vendors
customize their products to match the specialisation of different DWMs thus creating
an efficient distribution network [28], which sometimes goes beyond a base retail market
[27]. While these characteristics favour the DWM economy against the offline shadow
economy, DWMs sell a variety of illicit products [23–26], such as, drugs, fake IDs, “how
to” manuals (for scams, bombs etc.), and weapons. One prominent category is that of dig-
ital goods [63], including ransomware, social engineering guides, and financial malware
to steal credit cards and bank account credentials.
It is hard to estimate how many live DWMs currently exist. Some recent reports in-
clude one from independent researcher Gwern, who identified 19 live platforms on April
22, 2020 [64], the website www.darknetstats.com, which registered 10 live “established”
DWMs on May 27, 2020 [65], and one where 20 DWMs were observed one single day
(April 3, 2020) [35]. Currently established DWMs at the time of writing include Hydra
and White House marketplaces.
3 Data and methods
3.1 Dark web marketplaces
The listings used for our study were obtained by web crawling DWMs. Web crawling con-
sists of extracting data from websites and is performed by specialized software. Web crawl-
ing DWMs is a challenging task because crawlers must bypass several protective layers.
Most DWMs require authentication and some even require a direct invitation from a cur-
rent member. Additionally, strong CAPTCHAs [66] are implemented to avoid otherwise
easy and automated access to the online DWM. Several research groups tried to overcome
these challenges. Some examples are, HTTrack software used in [16], a combination of
PHP, the curl library, and MySQL was proposed in [67], the Python library scrapy adopted
in [68], and an automated methodology using the AppleScript language utilized in [69].
There are currently very few open source tools available [66, 70] for crawling DWMs,
which often leaves companies and federal agencies to rely on commercial software [71].
Downloading content from DWMs remains a challenging task, and the objective becomes
even harder when the research study requires monitoring multiple DWMs for an extended
period of time.
Our dataset contains listings crawled from 30 DWMs between January 1, 2020 and
November 16, 2020 by Flashpoint Intelligence [72], a company specializing in online risk
intelligence. It includes the most popular DWMs in 2020, such as Hydra, White House,
Empire and DarkMarket [35, 65]. The crawling pipeline consists of authenticating into
DWMs and downloading key attributes for each active listing, as highlighted in Fig. 1.
Bracci et al. EPJ Data Science            (2021) 10:6 Page 5 of 26
Figure 1 Example of a chloroquine listing in the DarkBay/Dbay marketplace, where we highlight some of its
salient attributes. Among the attributes considered in this work and shown in Table 4, “Time” and
“Marketplace name” attributes are not present in this screenshot, while the “Quantity” attribute is not fixed by
the vendor
Table 1 Categories used to classify the selected COVID-19 dataset. The first five categories constitute
COVID-19 specific listings, while the last one, called COVID-19mentions, includes listings mentioning
one of the keywords in Table 5 without selling actual COVID-19 specific listings
Category Examples
PPE gloves, gowns, masks, n95
Medicines azithromycin, chloroquine, azithromycin, favipiravir, remdesivir
Guides on scamming how to illicitly get COVID-19 relief packages
Web Domains covid-testing.in, coronavintheworld.com
Medical Frauds antidotes, vaccines, allegedly curative recreational drug mixes
Tests diagnosis, test
Fake Medical Records medical record, medical certification
Ventilators medical ventilators
COVID-19 mentions computer, drugs, scam (excluding listings in the previous categories)
Each DWM was crawled for at least 90 different days. We categorized the COVID-19 spe-
cific listings into PPE, medicines, guides on scamming, web domains, medical frauds, tests,
fake medical records, and ventilators. Representative examples of listings relative to these
categories are presented in Table 1, with specific listing examples in Appendix B.1. Only
a fraction of the selected listings were actual COVID-19 specific listings, since mitiga-
tion measures to prevent COVID-19 spreading have also impacted illegal trades of other
listings. For instance, a vendor might sell cocaine and mention shipping delays due to
COVID-19. We included such cases in the category COVID-19 mentions. For details about
data pre-processing, see Appendix A, where we explain how we select listings related to
COVID-19 and how we classify them in categories. We remark that our pre-processing
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Table 2 This Table reports the number of days each DWM was crawled, the number of unique
listings, all and COVID-19 specific, and the number of listing observations, all and COVID-19 specific.











Atshop 135 2748 0 88,014 0
Black Market Guns 293 18 0 5274 0
CanadaHQ 199 63,756 48 360,978 475
Cannabay 251 3578 0 4667 0
Cannazon 159 4160 0 8791 0
Connect 202 476 2 13,602 23
Cypher 138 14,167 14 370,497 495
DarkBay/DBay 127 132,054 425 848,408 6589
DarkMarket 109 54,170 49 89,515 70
Darkseid 321 8 0 2568 0
ElHerbolario 286 13 0 2130 0
Empire 150 58,754 94 221,466 201
Exchange 168 9631 0 31,605 0
Genesis 320 324,312 0 3,729,205 0
Hydra 263 13,648 2 96,965 5
MEGA Darknet 260 916 0 3219 0
MagBO 109 35,641 50 248,825 189
Monopoly 184 1125 2 98,074 272
Mouse In Box 154 2826 0 114,858 0
Plati.market 321 22,551 3 36,599 3
Rocketr 320 462 0 15,437 0
Selly 221 822 0 6415 0
Shoppy.gg 321 10,458 0 820,339 0
Skimmer Device 321 12 0 3852 0
Tor Market 130 634 0 25,344 0
Torrez 151 15,330 22 449,797 527
Venus Anonymous 309 84 0 25,660 0
White House 187 46,983 42 627,343 278
Willhaben 321 25,346 0 85,925 0
Yellow Brick 129 6516 35 103,221 337
Total ≥90 851,199 788 8,538,593 9464
pipeline is biased towards the English language, and this constitutes a limitation of our
work.
Overall, our dataset includes a total of 851,199 unique listings, which were observed a
total of 8,538,593 times between January 1, 2020 and November 16, 2020. In Table 2 we
report the breakdown of the number of unique listings and their total observations in each
of the 30 DWMs. We did not find any mention of COVID-19 on 12 DWMs (Atshop, Black
Market Guns, Cannabay, Darkseid, ElHerbolario, Exchange, Genesis, Mouse in Box, Rock-
etr, Selly, Skimmer Device and Venus Anonymous). This makes sense as these DWMs are
primarily focused on specific goods with a pre-defined listing text structure. A brief de-
scription of each DWM together with its specialization can be found in Table 7. On the
remaining 18 DWMs, there were a total of 10,455 unique listings related to COVID-19,
which constitutes less than 1% of the entire dataset. These listings were mostly composed
of drugs that reported discounts or delays in shipping due to COVID-19. Listings concern-
ing more specific COVID-19 goods such as masks, ventilators, and tests were available
on 13 DWMs (Connect, Cypher, DarkBay/DBay, DarkMarket, Empire, Hydra, MagBO,
Monopoly, Plati.market, Torrez, CanadaHQ, White House, and Yellow Brick). There were
788 COVID-19 specific listings in these DWMs which were observed 9464 times during
the analysed time period.
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3.2 Twitter
We sampled tweets related to COVID-19 using a freely available dataset introduced in
Chen et al [33]. We downloaded the tweets ID from the public GitHub repository and
then used the provided script to recover the original tweets through the Python library
twarc. We studied the temporal evolution of the number of tweets mentioning selected
keywords, such as “chloroquine”. In line with our dataset of DWM listings, most of the
considered tweets were written in English and the time period considered ranges from
January 21, 2020 to November 13, 2020.
3.3 Wikipedia
We used the publicly available Wikipedia API [34] to collect data about the number of vis-
its at specific pages related with COVID-19, such as chloroquine. The Wikipedia search
engine was case-sensitive and we considered strings with the first letter uppercase, while
the others lowercase. We looked for the number Wikipedia page visits in the English lan-
guage from January 1, 2020 to November 16, 2020.
4 Results
We assessed the impact of COVID-19 on online illicit trade along three main criteria. First,
we focused on the 13 DWMs containing at least one COVID-19 specific listing, analysing
their offers in terms of the categories PPE, medicines, guides on scamming, web domains,
medical frauds, tests, fake medical records, and ventilators, as introduced in Table 1. Sec-
ond, we considered the 18 DWMs that included at least one listing in one of the categories
in Table 1, thus adding listings to the COVID-19 mentions category in our analysis. We
investigated the relationship between major COVID-19 events, public attention, and the
time evolution of the number of active listings. Third, we quantified the indirect impact
that COVID-19 had on all 30 DWMs under consideration by tracking the percentage of
listings mentioning the themes of lockdown, delays, and sales. We linked their frequency
to major COVID-19 events.
4.1 Categories of listings
Here, we focus on the 788 COVID-19 specific listings present in our dataset, observed
9464 times in the considered time window. PPE is the most represented category, with
355 unique listings (45.1% of COVID-19 specific listings) observed 5660 times (59.8%
of observations of COVID-19 specific listings). The second most represented category
is medicines, with 228 (28.9%) unique listings observed 1917 (20.3% of all) times. Some
medicines listings, which are often sold together, included 38 chloroquine listings, 65
hydroxychloroquine listings, 51 azythromicin listings and 45 Amoxicillin listings. Other
medicines included 2 remdesivir listings, one of the drugs used to treat USA’s president
Trump [73]. A breakdown of the medicines category together with a brief description of
the specific drugs can be found in Table 8, and multiple medicines are sometimes sold in
the same listing. Another prominent category was guides on scamming, with 99 unique
listings (12.6%). It includes manuals on how to earn money exploiting flaws in COVID-19
related government relief funds, and others on how to exploit alleged pandemic related
security weaknesses (e.g. online banking, delivery systems). A breakdown of the different
kinds of guides can be found in Table 9. One DWM (MagBO) was specialised in selling
web domains, like “coronavirusmasks.in,” with 50 unique listings (6.3%). Additionally, we
Bracci et al. EPJ Data Science            (2021) 10:6 Page 8 of 26
Table 3 Summary statistics for the considered categories of listings. For each category, we included
the number of unique listings, observations, and vendors. If the same vendor sold listings in different
categories, we counted it as one unique vendor
Category Unique listings Total observations Vendors
PPE 355 (45.1%) 5660 (59.8%) 88 (34.9%)
Medicines 228 (28.9%) 1917 (20.3%) 106 (42.1%)
Guides on scamming 99 (12.6%) 1244 (13.1%) 40 (15.9%)
Web Domains 50 (6.3%) 189 (2.0%) 15 (6.0%)
Medical Frauds 34 (4.3%) 316 (3.3%) 23 (9.1%)
Tests 17 (2.2%) 51 (0.5%) 13 (5.2%)
Fake Medical Records 3 (0.4%) 9 (0.1%) 3 (1.2%)
Ventilators 2 (0.3%) 78 (0.8%) 2 (0.8%)
COVID-19 788 (100%) 9464 (100%) 252 (100%)
classified 34 (4.3%) unique listings as medical frauds, which are listings that promised im-
munity from COVID-19 (no such product exists, at the moment of writing), or supposed
devices able to detect COVID-19 in the air. These listings also included illicit drug mixes
sold as cures. We also registered 17 test (2.2% of COVID-19 specific listings), 3 fake med-
ical records (0.4%) and 2 ICU ventilator (0.3%) listings. More details on these listings to-
gether with some examples are reported in Appendix B. There were a total of 252 vendors
selling COVID-19 specific listings. Additionally, sellers posted multiple unique listings.
In fact, 88 of them sold PPE (34.9%), 106 sold medicines (42.1%), 40 sold guides on scam-
ming (15.9%), 15 web domains (6.0%), 23 sold medical frauds (9.1%), 13 sold tests (5.2%),
3 sold fake medical records (1.2%), and 2 sold ventilators (0.8%). The information in this
paragraph is summarized in Table 3.
It is important to note that vendors often do not provide complete information on their
listings but rather invite direct communication to facilitate sales. In 391 (49.6%) unique
listings, the vendor invited potential customers to communicate via email or messaging
applications such as WhatsApp, Wickr Me, and Snapchat. Thus, 511 (64.8%) COVID-
19 specific listings contained no information about the offered amount of goods, 579
(73.5%) did not provide shipping information, and 16 (2.0%) did not disclose the listing
price.
PPE and web domains were the least expensive products with a median price of 5 USD.
Followed by medicines with 33 USD, guides on scamming with 75 USD, fake medical
records with 130 USD, tests with 250 USD, medical frauds with 275 USD, and ventilators
with 1400 USD. The distribution of prices for these categories can be found in Fig. 2(a). It
shows that many listings had a low price of around a few USD or less and only few listings
exceeded thousands or more USD. The cumulative value of the detected unique listings
was 563,202 USD, where we excluded listings with prices larger than 40,000 USD using
manual inspection. When vendors post listings at high price this typically indicates they
have halted sales of an item with the expectation of selling it again in the future. We remove
these anomalously high priced listings since they would largely overestimate the sales price
of actually active listings [18]. The shipping information declared in the analysed listings
involved a total of 18 countries or regions. Most of the vendors are willing to ship world-
wide. Shipping from different continents appears possible because some vendors explicitly
declare in listing descriptions that they have multiple warehouses across the globe, while
shipping to any continent is done through specialized delivery services. The United States
is the second largest exporter and shipping destination. The United Kingdom is the third
Bracci et al. EPJ Data Science            (2021) 10:6 Page 9 of 26
Figure 2 (a) Box plot of the distribution of listing prices for each COVID-19 category. The box ranges from the
lower to the upper quartile, with the horizontal line indicating the median. The whiskers extend up to the 5th
and 95th percentiles respectively. The dots represent outliers. (b) Shipping information in COVID-19 specific
listings. Note that 545 (or 71.1%) of these listings did not provide any shipping information
largest exporter and importer, and no vendors explicitly mentioned Germany as a shipping
destination even thought it is the fourth largest exporter. Complete shipping information
is available in Fig. 2(b). Some examples of the COVID-19 specific listings are available in
the Appendix B.1.
Figure 3(a) presents a word cloud built from the titles of the selected COVID-19 spe-
cific listings. The word cloud was built from 1-grams, meaning single words, excluding
common English words and stop words. The COVID-19 pandemic was referred to as ei-
ther “coronavirus,” “corona,” “covid,” or “covid19”. Among COVID-19 medicines, “hydrox-
ychloroquine,” and “chloroquine” were the most popular ones, with fewer mentions of
“azithromycin,” “medicated,” and “medical” products in general.
DarkBay/DBay marketplace contained the majority of the COVID-19 specific listings
in our dataset, amounting to 425 (54.0%). The most available unique listings in Dark-
Bay/DBay were PPE, which totaled 293. We also found 105 medicines, 24 medical frauds,
2 ventilators, and 1 tests. The number of listings available in the other DWMs was: 94 in
Empire (which shut down in August 2020), 50 in MagBO, 49 in DarkMarket, 48 in The
Canadian Headquarters, 42 in White House, and 35 in Yellow Brick. These numbers to-
gether with statistics of the less represented DWMs are as shown in Table 2. The entire
breakdown of the number of COVID-19 specific listings detected in each category is avail-
able in Fig. 3(b).
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Figure 3 (a) Word cloud for “Listing title” in COVID-19 specific listings. (b) Category breakdown of COVID-19
specific listings in the DWM that offered them. (c) Fraction of vendors selling at least one COVID-19 specific
listing. (d) Vendor specialisation. Most vendors responsible for at least one COVID-19 specific listing also sell
other listings, and in greater number
In Fig. 3(c), we ranked the DWMs by their share of vendors selling COVID-19 specific
listings. The total number of vendors behind COVID-19 specific listings in our dataset is
252. Most vendors sold only one COVID-19 specific listing, while few of them sold more
than ten different unique COVID-19 specific listings. In Appendix D, we analysed the
distribution of COVID-19 specific listings for each vendor. We found that it was hetero-
geneous according to a power-law with an exponent equal to –2.3 and 80% of the ven-
dors had fewer than 5 unique listings, as shown in Fig. 7. This may imply that vendors of
COVID-19 related products have a focus on a specific product category, or are just creat-
ing one-off listings to try to make quick money. In DarkBay/DBay, more than 15% of the
vendors were selling COVID-19 specific listings, while in MagBO, The Canadian Head-
Quarters, and Cypher this fraction was around 5% (with almost all other DWMs around
1%). This shows that law enforcement or intelligence intervention should not necessarily
be approached evenly across marketplaces but instead focused on select marketplaces first
with a higher concentration of COVID-19 specific listings. Finally, Fig. 3(d) shows that es-
sentially no vendors specialised on COVID-19 products, with only 7 vendors selling more
COVID-19 specific listings than unrelated ones, 4 of which actually sold just one or two
COVID-19 specific listings overall in our dataset.
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Figure 4 Longitudinal analysis of DWM activity. (a) Seven-days rolling average of active listings mentioning
COVID-19 and COVID-19 specific listings. (b) Seven-days rolling average of the observed COVID-19 specific
listings in themedicines and PPE categories. Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a) and (b) corresponded to
significant COVID-19 world events, see Appendix C. (c) Seven-days median price with 95% confidence interval
for COVID-19 specific listings. (d) Seven-days median price with 95% confidence interval for active COVID-19
specific listings in the PPE andmedicines categories
4.2 Time evolution of DWM listings and public attention
The number of active unique listings evolved over time, as shown in Fig. 4(a). The first
COVID-19 specific listing in our dataset appeared on January 28, 2020, following the
Wuhan lockdown [1]. In March, lockdowns in many countries [74, 75] corresponded to an
increase in the number of these listings, whose number kept increasing until May. In June
and July, when quarantine restrictions in the northern hemisphere started to ease [76],
we observed a decreasing trend in the selected COVID-19 specific listings, which con-
tinued until November. COVID-19 mentions followed the same trend with two notable
exceptions. We observed two sudden increases in COVID-19 in correspondence of the
second wave of contagions in Europe in September [77] and new lockdown measures in
November [78]. Figure 4(b) shows the evolution of the total number of observed PPE and
medicines, the two most available COVID-19 specific listings in our dataset (see Table 3).
PPE followed a trend compatible with the overall observations shown in Fig. 4(a), with a
peak in May and a sudden decrease after July, as PPE have gradually become more avail-
able worldwide with respect to the shortage in the beginning of the pandemic. COVID-19
medicines remained approximately stable throughout these months, with a peak after USA
president Donald Trump first referred to chloroquine [79]. A different trend was found for
COVID-19 guides on scamming, which saw spikes in the number of listings in correspon-
dence to event related to relief program measures [80–82]. More details can be found in
Appendix D, Fig. 8.
The time evolution of the listing prices followed a different pattern. We considered
the median price and its 95% confidence interval of active COVID-19 specific listings in
Fig. 4(c), and of active PPE and medicines, in Fig. 4(d). Until March, the only COVID-19
specific listings concerned medicines, which influenced the overall median price. After-
wards, when PPE listings started to appear, they led the variation in the overall median
price. In fact, over the entire time window, the median price of medicines listings was rea-
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sonably stable. PPE listings, instead, had a high price for March and most of April, possibly
due to speculation. Interestingly, at the end of April, a vendor named “optimus,” active on
DarkBay, started selling large quantities of PPE at 1 USD, putting many online listings at
the same time, thus drastically reducing the median price, which remained low until July.
Overall, “optimus” had 91 PPE listings during the registered period. PPE median price then
increased back to the March level in July, when general worldwide availability of masks for
the general population decreased the demand for small quantities of products. We report
an analysis of the listings price for COVID-19 guides on scamming in Fig. 8 of Appendix D.
We also considered tweets and Wikipedia page visits as proxies for public attention, as
already done in prior studies analysing the COVID-19 pandemic [83–85]. We compared
trends in public attention with temporal variations in the number of active COVID-19
specific listings on DWMs. We focused our analysis on the PPE category and on relevant
medicines in our dataset: hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine, and azitrhomycin. Figure 5(a)
shows that a first peak in public attention on PPE was reached in late January following the
Wuhan lockdown [1]. A second peak occurred in March [84] when PPE listings started to
appear in DWMs. The number of PPE listings reached their maximum in May. After May,
PPE listings steadily decreased along with public attention. It is worth noting that May
also marked the end of the first wave of contagion in many European countries [86]. PPE
listings virtually disappeared in July, as products became more accessible in legal shops.
On the contrary Twitter saw a huge spike in June, when many states decided to gradually
lift lockdown measures [76], causing a public debates on mask wearing which increased
the twitter signal to stable high levels until November.
Figure 5 DWMs and public attention. (a)-(c) Seven-days rolling average of active listings selling PPE, together
with the time evolution of the number of tweets referring to masks and of visits in the relative Wikipedia page
visits. (b)-(d) Similar comparison as in panels (a)-(c) but considering active listings of hydroxychloroquine,
chloroquine, and azithromycin. Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a) and (b) mark significant events related
with COVID-19, see Appendix C. See Appendix D for panels (a) and (b) with a linear y-axis
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A similar relationship between mass media news, public attention, and DWMs was reg-
istered for the listings regarding the three considered medicines, as shown in Figs. 5(b)
and (d). Four peaks in public attention were detected after four declarations from Presi-
dent Trump about these medicines [79, 87–89]. The number of active medicines listings
closely followed. However, a closer look reveals the different shapes of Wikipedia page
visits, tweets, and DWM active listings curves. Wikipedia page visits saw a very high peak
of page visits after the first declaration from President Trump [79], and smaller peaks in
correspondence in the following declarations. Tweets instead saw peaks of attention of in-
creasing height. DWM listings on the contrary were much steadier in time and with little
variation in the number of active listings throughout the first wave of the pandemic, while
decreasing to a lower steady availability from the summer.
4.3 Impact of COVID-19 on other listings
We considered the indirect impact of COVID-19 on all the 30 DWMs in our dataset. We
analyzed all listings in these DWMs (COVID-19 related and beyond), and looked at list-
ings mentioning: lockdown, using keywords “lockdown” or “quarantine,” delay, using “de-
lay” or “shipping problem,” and sales, using “sale,” “discount,” or “special offer.” Examples
of listings reporting these keywords are available in Appendix B.2.
Figure 6(a)-(b)-(c) shows the percentage of all listings mentioning these themes over
time. The percentage of all listings in the 30 DWMs mentioning lockdown never exceeded
1%, as illustrated in Fig. 6(a). It reached its maximum in November, when Europe started
new lockdown measures [78]. Other peaks occurred in April and September, when nations
first started to implement these measures [1, 74, 75] and at the beginning of the second
wave of contagion in Europe [77], respectively. Delay mentions reached local peaks in
March and May. These peaks occurred after major COVID-19 events, such as lockdowns
[74, 75] and the situation in Europe starting to improve [86], respectively. Two global
Figure 6 Percentage of all active listings mentioning the themes lockdown, delay and sales in panels (a), (b),
(c), respectively. (d) Percentage of active listings in panels (a), (b), (c) that mentioned also COVID-19 in their
listings. Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a), (b), and (c) corresponded to major COVID-19 events, see
Appendix C
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peaks, instead, were reached in September and November, when cases started to surge
again in Europe [77] and when Europe started new lockdown measures [78], as shown in
Fig. 6(b). A similar pattern was visible for the percentage of all listings mentioning sales.
In addition, we observed that sales had a first peak corresponding to the New Year, which
is a common practice of many offline regulated shops, as displayed in Fig. 6(c). Despite
observing that the increase in the percentage of all listings mentioning sales, delays, and
lockdown followed major events related to the pandemic, not all of these listings also men-
tioned COVID-19. We further researched this by plotting which percentage of the relative
listings also mentioned COVID-19 in Fig. 6(d). The percentage of listings mentioning that
current sales were due to COVID-19 was less than 1%, while mentions of delays reached
up to 40%. For lockdown it was close to 100% until July, as one can expect since lockdowns
exist because of COVID-19. In the three selected cases, the percentages of listings men-
tioning COVID-19 followed the global awareness about the current pandemic: increasing
trends from January to the July [1, 74, 75, 90], less attention during the summer [86], and
a returning increase in September and November [77, 78].
5 Discussion
We investigated the presence of listings related to COVID-19 in 30 DWMs, monitored
over a ten-months period in 2020. We considered COVID-19 specific listings and COVID-
19 mentions, found them in 13 and 18 DWMs, respectively. COVID-19 specific listings
totaled 788 unique products and represented less than 1% of our dataset. The majority of
COVID-19 specific listings offered PPE (45.1%), followed by medicines (28.9%), guides on
scamming (12.6%), web domains (6.3%), medical frauds (4.3%), tests (2.2%), fake medical
records (0.4%) and ventilators (0.3%). Most COVID-19 specific listings did not report the
quantity sold (64.8%) or shipping information (73.5%). Almost half of these listings invited
potential customers to communicate via email or messaging applications, like WhatsApp
(49.6%). Although direct communication fosters a trustworthy vendor-buyer relationship
and may lay the ground for future transactions outside DWMs, it also exposes users to
higher risk of being traced by law enforcement [91].
In our dataset, DarkBay/DBay is featured prominently among DWMs offering COVID-
19 specific listings. Ranking in the top 100 sites in the entire dark web [92], DarkBay/DBay
is regarded as the eBay of the dark web because it offers more listings categories than other
DWMs [93]. It was also frequently accessible during the period of time monitored during
this research, with an uptime of 80%, higher from the 77% uptime of Empire, the largest
global DWM at the time of writing [94].
Our work corroborates previous findings and expands them in several ways. To the best
of our knowledge, the most extensive report to date examined the presence of COVID-
19 specific listings in 20 DWMs on one single day (April 3, 2020) [35]. Despite only a
subset of overlapping DWMs between that report and our study, (Cypher, DarkBay/DBay,
DarkMarket, Empire, Monopoly, Venus Anonymous, White House, and Yellow Brick) we
both assessed that COVID-19 specific listings constituted less than 1% of the total listings
in the DWMs ecosystem. These listings were mostly PPE, followed by medicines and they
were found in only a few DWMs, while non COVID-19 specific listings were widespread.
An important novelty of the present study is the analysis of the temporal evolution of
DWM behaviour and its relationship to public attention, as quantified through tweets
and Wikipedia page visits. Following the Wuhan lockdown [1], we observed a first peak in
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public attention [85], and a corresponding emergence of the COVID-19 specific listings.
A second peak in public attention occurred in March, when quarantine measures were
adopted by many European countries [74, 75]. Again, during the same period, the num-
ber of COVID-19 specific listings sharply increased. When worldwide quarantine began
to ease [76] in many countries, in June and July, we registered a decrease in public at-
tention and in available COVID-19 specific listings. Towards the end of 2020, we did not
detect significant variations in COVID-19 specific listings and public attention, in corre-
spondence of the second wave of contagions [77] and new lockdown measures in Europe
[78]. Both vendors of COVID-19 specific listings and public attention have adapted to the
COVID-19 pandemic and react more smoothly to its development.
Listing prices correlated with both variations in public attention and individual choices
of a few vendors. Median price experienced a sharp increase in March, probably due to
speculation, and then decreased in April due to the choice of a single vendor responsible
for 91 listings, named “optimus.” The vendor sold a large quantity of PPE at 1 USD only,
which constituted the 37% of active PPE listings in April. Finally, we observed an increase
in the percentage of all listings citing delays in shipping and sale offers, which peaked in
March, May, September, and November. Similar to a prior work that found Wikipedia page
visits of a given drug to be a good predictor for its demand in DWMs [95], we provided
further evidence that the DWMs ecosystem is embedded in our society and responds in
line with social changes [96]. The DWMs ecosystem swiftly reacted to the pandemic by
offering goods in high demand, and even offering vaccines already in March, when no
tested vaccination existed.
Our research shares some limitations with previous studies, namely that not all active
DWMs were surveyed. For instance, we did not analyse 12 of the DWMs explored in the
previous report [35]. It must be noted, however, that the number of active DWMs is con-
stantly changing due to closures or new openings [19] and obtaining full coverage is chal-
lenging due to the active efforts of DMWs to obstruct research studies and law enforce-
ment investigations, for example through the use of CAPTCHAs. Another limitation is
the lack of reliable fully automated annotation method: this forced us to manually anno-
tate listings and thus limited our analysis to listings only directly related to COVID-19.
One key problem to be solved in this regard is the presence of false positives when do-
ing a keyword search. In the presence of a more automated pipeline, one could extend this
analysis to a more precise quantification of the effect of the pandemic on traditional goods
traded on DWMs such as weapons, drugs, or digital goods.
6 Conclusion
By revealing that DWMs listings of goods related to COVID-19 exist and are correlated
with public attention, we highlight the need for a close monitoring of the online shadow
economy in the future months, in order to control and anticipate dangerous effects of the
COVID-19 “infodemic” [84, 85]. We plan to improve our analysis of DWM activity by
increasing the number of monitored DWMs and conducting a more extensive analysis of
the impact on the pandemic on overall DWM trade by considering changes in prices of
non-COVID-19 specific listings, such as drugs, weapons, or malware. We released a new
website [97], where we will provide constant updates on the effect of the pandemic on
DWMs.
We anticipate that our work will interest a wide audience and spark new research. Fu-
ture research work may further explore the behaviour of DWMs over time, potentially
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extending the spectrum of monitored goods and relating the observed trends to specific
social changes. Policy makers and public agencies (especially those focused on protect-
ing consumer rights and health) can use our findings to better assess and shape the ef-
fects of legislation on the shadow economy [98]. Practitioners may gain insights on how
DWMs posit additional threats to public health. Uninformed citizens exposed to waves
of misinformation, such as the ones related to hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine, and az-
itrhomycin [79, 87–89], may be tempted to shop on DWMs thus exposing themselves to
serious health risks. Moreover, the availability of regulated products currently in short-
age in the traditional economy undermines anti-price gouging regulations and regulated
businesses which sell the same products.
Appendix A: Data pre-processing
In the following, we describe the DWMs dataset in more details, by focusing on how list-
ings were stored and how we formed the COVID-19 categories in Table 1, that is, PPE,
medicines, guides on scamming, web domains, medical frauds, tests, fake medical records,
ventilators, and COVID-19 mentions.
The listings appearing on the DWMs were crawled and stored according to selected
attributes. While a brief explanation of these attributes is already presented in Table 4,
here we focus on those attributes which involved some pre-processing before the anal-
ysis, that is, “Shipping information,” “Quantity,” and “Price.” The “Shipping information”
attribute was initially stored considering what the vendor declared. Then, it was standard-
ised among vendors to correct any misspellings, using the standard python library pycoun-
try. Vendors may declare a specific country, like United States, a continent, like Europe, or
the entire world, which we standardise here as worldwide. The “Quantity” attribute was
instead retrieved from the title of the listing using Facebook open-source library Duck-
ling [99], then it was manually checked and corrected during an annotation process. The
“Price” attribute on DWMs was displayed in the listings in various currencies, such as
cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies. In order to standardise and properly compare listing
prices, we converted prices to USD at the daily conversion rate. Rates were taken from
Cryptocompare [100] for cryptocurrencies, and from the European Central Bank [101]
for fiat currencies.
The attributes “Listing body” and “Listing title” in Table 4, representing the title and de-
scription of the listings, were used to select the COVID-19 categories in Table 1. To this
end, we prepared two sets of keywords as shown in Table 5. Every selected COVID-19
listing contained either a word in the “Listing body” that matched one keyword in the first
Table 4 Selected attributes of the listings under consideration along with a brief explanation of their
respective purposes
Attribute of a listing Explanation
“Listing body” Description of the listing as it appears in the DWM
“Listing title” Title of the listing as it appears in the DWM
“Marketplace name” Name of the DWM
“Shipping information” Where the listing is declared to ship from and to
“Time” When the listing is observed
“Quantity” Quantity of the listing sold
“Price” Price of listing
“Vendor” Unique identifier of the vendor
Bracci et al. EPJ Data Science            (2021) 10:6 Page 17 of 26
Table 5 Keywords used to sample COVID-19 specific listings from the DWMs in Table 2
First set of keywords checked against the words included in the attribute “Listing body” in Table 4
corona virus, coronavirus, covid, covid-19, covid19
Second set of keywords checked against the words included in the attribute “Listing title” in Table 4
anakinra, antidote, antiviral, azithromycin, baloxavir, baricitinib, bemcentinib, chloroquin,
corona virus, coronavirus, covid, covid-19, covid19, darunavir, dexamethason, diagnosis,
diagnostic, favipiravir, ganciclovir, glove, gown, lopinavir, marboxil, mask, n95, n99,
oseltamivir, prevention, remdesivir, repurposed, ribavirin, ritonavir, sanitiser,
sanitizer, sarilumab, siltuximab, surgical, thermo scanner, thermo-scanner,
thermometr, thermoscanner, tocilizumab, umifenovir, vaccine, ventilator, ciprofloxacin,
doxyciclin, metronidazol, amoxicillin
set or a word in the “Listing title” that matched one keyword in the second set. The ratio-
nale behind this choice was that the listing title was usually more precise on the product
sold, whereas the body might contain promotions of other items the vendor was selling
in other listings. At the same time, the vendor might mention COVID-19 in the body for
various reasons, which we analysed in the main text. In order to classify listings in either
COVID-19 specific listings (that is, PPE, medicines, guides on scamming, web domains,
medical frauds, tests, fake medical records, ventilators) or COVID-19 mentions, we ran a
regex query in google bigquery. We remark that the chosen method returned words con-
taining a string equal to one of our keywords. For instance, with the keyword chloroquin,
we detected also chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine. After this automatic filtering step,
we manually checked the selected COVID-19 related listings to further improve the accu-
racy of our sample. In order to minimize human error, at least two authors of the present
manuscript checked each of these listings. A limitation of our approach was that keywords
considered were in English. Therefore, even if drug names such as chloroquine were com-
mon to many languages and we detected some listings in a non-English language, our
sample of COVID-19 related listings was biased toward the English language.
While each listing had an associated url to determine its uniqueness, which allowed us
to track listing over time, vendors receiving bad reviews sometimes put identical copies of
the same listing online. To overcome this issue and correctly count the number of listings,
we determined a listing as unique if it had the combination of “Listing body,” “Listing title,”
“Marketplace name,” and “Vendor” different than any other listings. For instance, if two
listings had the same title and body but were sold in two different DWMs, we considered
them as two different listings. Also, we considered at most one observation for each unique
listing per day. The total number of unique listings and observations of these listings in
each DWM is available in Table 2.
Appendix B: Examples of listings related with COVID-19 in dark web
marketplaces
Here, we present detailed examples of the selected listings. We consider both COVID-19
specific listings and COVID-19 mentions.
B.1 COVID-19 specific listings
The most popular category of COVID-19 specific listings was PPE, which included mainly
face masks. We detected listings selling small quantities of masks, like “KN95 Face Mask
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for Corona Virus box of 50” priced at 50 USD, while others proposed wholesale deals, as in
“AFFORDABLE 20 BOXS OF SURGICAL FACE MASK (WHOLESALE PRICE)” in which
5000 masks were available at 2000 USD.
The second most popular COVID-19 category was guides on scamming and includes
listings explaining how to stole several kinds of COVID-19 related relief funds. Specifi-
cally, a subset of these listings were about the Small Business Administration loan in the
USA. They provided step-by-step instructions, with constant updates to ensure the scam
activities were effective. One listing in particular suggested: “I do not recommend taking
more than 10,000 of the approved amount, because after that cashing out becomes a little
harder.” The price of this listing was 113 USD.
MagBo was the only DWM selling listings in the web domains category. These listings
may cause a potential threat to public health. They may be the actor of several phishing
activities or sell scams. Examples of these web domains were “coronavintheworld.com,”
“covid-conspiracy.net,” and “coronavirusmasks.in.” Prices of these domains were low and
less than 10 USD.
Listings on the medicines category were composed mostly by chloroquine, hydroxy-
chloroquine, and azythromicin. We registered several wholesale deals, as in “9000 tabs
hydroxychloroquine 200mg (USA AND CANADA ONLY)” where 9000 tabs were sold for
1194 USD. The smallest quantity we detected was 50 pills “chloroquine 50pills for 250$,”
sold at 250 USD. We also noticed that vendors often specified the size of the pill, being
it 200 mg, 250 mg, or 50 mg. The azythromicin was usually sold together with hydroxy-
chloroquine as a prescription against COVID-19. One example of it was “hydroxychloro-
quine sulfate 200mg and azithromycin 250mg,” where an unknown quantity of these drugs
was sold for 40 USD.
In the COVID-19 category of medical frauds, the most prominent listings were vaccines.
Despite at the moment of writing of the first version of this manuscript (July 2020), vac-
cines are far from being actually developed, they were sold in DWMs since March. These
listings included both low price vaccines like “complete order free shipment COVID19
VACCINE,” sold at just 200 USD, or high price one like “Covid-19 Vaccine. Lets keep it
low key for now,” priced at 15,000 USD. In addition, among the listings in the medical
frauds category, one could find potentially dangerous illicit drug mixes with claimed cu-
rative power against COVID-19, like “Protect yourself from the corona virus:” a marijuana
based drug mix supposedly helpful in recovery from coronavirus infection. Other medical
frauds included a 300 USD “CORONAVIRUS DETECtOR DEVICE, SAVE LIVES NOW”
or a 1000 USD “Buy CORONAVIRUS THERMO METER.”
Tests category of COVID-19 specific listings count a few different items. We detected
listings in the tests category both at low quantities, such as, “25 pcs COVID-19 (coron-
avirus) quick test,” sold for 430 USD, or at very large one, like “Corona Virus Test / Covid-
19 Test Kits (5000Pcs),” for a price of 7500 USD.
The three listings in the fake medical records categories can be used to fake COVID-
19 diagnosis. One of these listings said in its title: “Novelty/Fake Medical Records! Any
diagnosis, custom made.” And in its body claimed “The right medical excuse can get you
out of anything, and open many doors,” with a following disclaimer “IT IS UP TO YOU TO
USE THESE ETHICALLY AND LEGALLY!” The price for this listing was 20 USD only,
which could favour its wide adoption.
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The two listings in the ventilator category were ICU ventilators. They were advertis-
ing fundamental hospital instrument, such as, “ICU Respiratory Ventilators, Emergency
Room Vents” sold at 800 USD or “BiPAP oxygen concentrator ventilato Amid Covid-19”
for 2000 USD.
B.2 COVID-19 mentions
We describe three examples of listings in the COVID-19 mentions category. The listing
with title “Best Organic Virginia Bright Tobacco Premium quality 600g” refers to the lock-
down in its body as “unfortunately we have to respect coronavirus lockdowns, in order to
ensure as much security as possible, we had to choose one type of shiping that is unfor-
tunately much more expensive while lockdowns last.” Another listing with title “(Out of
Stock! Lower Price for Pre-orders Only) Testosterone Enanthate 250mg/ml - 10ml - Buy
4 Get 1,” mentions in the body that they “are currently out of stock of this product due
to our oil suppliers not being able to get their raw powders shipped to them because of
the Coronavirus” and they “have lowered the price a little to help make up for this de-
lay.” A third listing mention a sale directly in the title “COVID-19 SPECIAL OFFER 1GR
CROWN BOLIVIAN COCAINE 90% £65,” and link the discount with the distress caused
by the pandemic.
Appendix C: Timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic
In this Section we aim at providing a summary of the main events related to the pandemic,
focusing on the ones cited in the main text and listed in Table 6. This is by no means a
complete summary of the COVID-19 pandemic timeline.
The first event to gain international attention and make the public aware of the coron-
avirus was the decision from China to lockdown the city of Wuhan, first epicenter of the
pandemic, on January 23, 2020 [1]. The virus then found its way to Europe, where the first
country to be heavily hit by the pandemic was Italy. The Italian government decided to
lockdown the entire country on March 9, 2020 [74]. The virus rapidly spread in Europe
Table 6 Significant COVID-19 events. We defined an acronym for each event and reported it in the
main text plots. Please note that this list does not intend to be exhaustive or to establish a ranking
between events
Date Event Acronym
2020-1-23 Wuhan Lockdown [1] Wuhan
2020-3-9 Italy Lockdown [74] Italy
2020-3-18 USA’s President Trump first refers to chloroquine [79] Trump 1
2020-3-27 USA’s President Trump signs the CARES act [80] Cares
2020-4-3 1M COVID-19 cases worldwide [90] 1M cases
2020-4-5 USA’s President Trump promotes the use of chloroquine and
hydroxychloroquine against COVID-19 [87]
Trump 2
2020-4-24 COVID-19 cases in Europe are beggining to slow down [86] Europe
2020-5-18 USA’s President Trump declares he is taking hydroxychloroquine
preventively against COVID-19 [88]
Trump 3
2020-6-9 Governments start to lift lockdown measures around the world [76] Openings
2020-6-30 USA senate agrees to extend small business rescue [81] SBA
2020-7-28 Twitter limits Donald Trump Jr’s account for posting COVID-19
misinformation [89]
Trump 4
2020-9-7 Spain is the first country in Europe to record half a million COVID-19
cases [77]
Second wave
2020-9-10 Negotiations for the Heroes act keep failing [82] Heroes
2020-10-31 PM announces four-week England lockdown [78] New lockdowns
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and internationally, with cases appearing more and more in the United States, leading
USA’s President Donald Trump to first take a stance on the possibility of using chloro-
quine to cure individuals infected from COVID on the March 18, 2020 [79]. The epidemic
started to heavily hit the United States and cases were surging almost everywhere in the
world: 70 days after the lockdown of Wuhan, the worldwide count of infections had al-
ready surpassed 1 Million cases on April 3, 2020 [90]. On March 27, President Trump
signed the Cares Act with the first economic aids to whose affected by COVID-19 [80].
After that, he explicitly promoted the use of hydroxychloroquine on April 5, 2020, before
any official medical trial ended [87]. In April the situation started to become asymmetric.
In Europe, thanks to the many policies in place, the COVID-19 became less threatening
[86] and lockdowns started to be eased [76]. USA and other countries were instead seeing
a rise in cases, and the USA Senate prolonged the small business rescue fund [81].
In May, President Trump declared he was now taking Hydroxychloroquine preventively
against COVID-19 [88], while in July, he posted a video (labet banned by Twitter) diffus-
ing misinformation about the medicine [89]. The second wave of contagions hit Spain in
September, and few weeks later the entire Europe [77], while The USA saw the failing on
the negotiations around a second relief package [82]. Several new lockdown measures have
took place in November in Europe [78] and, through that month, the number of COVID-
19 related new infections has started to reduce. In the meantime, the USA is continuing
to register a high number of new contagions.
Appendix D: Supplementary material
In this Section we provide additional material that support our main findings. In Table 7
we provide more details on the 30 DWMs considered in our study. In particular we indi-
cate the main specialization of the DWMs, i.e., the main category of products sold. If it is
“Mixed”, it means that the DWM is not specialised in any particular category of goods. In
the description we instead put information on the DWMs, with more details where avail-
able. All this information has been researched and compiled by the authors, with particular
help given by Flashpoint Intelligence [72].
In Table 8 we provide a Table reporting the different COVID-19 related medicines which
were found in the listings. The medicines were selected as they have been found or claimed
to be effective against COVID-19 [32]. The number of listings related to each medicine is
also reported, noting that some listings sell more than one medicine (e.g. listings selling
both hydroxychloroquine and azitrhomycin). We do the same for guides on scamming in
Table 9, reporting the different kinds of guides which were found in the listings.
In Fig. 7 we plot the distribution of listings per vendor in log-log plot, showing a clear
power-law shape with exponent –2.0. In the inset of Fig. 7, we show the histogram using
linear spacing, through which we understand that most vendors sold very few COVID-19
specific listings, while few vendors going as high as 91 different listings. We noted that
80% of the vendors had indeed less or equal than 5 listings.
In the main text, we performed a longitudinal analysis of the time evolution of all
COVID-19 specific listings and all listings mentioning COVID-19, as well as the PPE and
medicines categories, as shown in Fig. 4. Now, we provide a similar analysis for COVID-19
guides on scamming, as illustrated in Fig. 8. We observe they first appeared in March, when
the first lockdown measures were adopted. The number of listings then started increasing
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Table 7 List of all DWMs, together with their specialization and a brief description
DWM Specialization Description
Atshop Digital Goods Atshop e-commerce marketplace platform
Black Market Guns Weapons Weapons Marketplace, now exit scammed according to onion.live [57]
CanadaHQ Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace
Cannabay Drugs Russian language drug marketplace focusing on cannabis
Cannazon Drugs (Cannabis) Drug marketplace for cannabis products only
Connect Mixed A social network that hosts a marketplace for the sale of illicit goods
Cypher Mixed Cypher is a multivendor market for the sale of drugs and digital goods.
DarkBay/DBay Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency DWM selling digital goods, drugs, and
services
Dark Market Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency DWM selling digital goods, drugs, and
services
Darkseid Weapons Weapons DWM
ElHerbolario Drugs Single-vendor shop, selling just 3 products, primarily leaning towards
Cannabis
Empire Mixed Alphabay-style DWM with BTC, LTC, XMR, MultiSig, and PGP 2FA
Exchange Mixed Chinese language marketplace
Genesis Digital goods Marketplace selling digital identities for account takeover activities
Hydra Drugs Russian language drug DWM
MagBO Digital Goods Shell, account and card shop
MEGA Darknet Mixed Russian language DWM
Monopoly Drugs Multivendor market that is primarily focused on drugs
Mouse In Box Digital Goods Marketplace that sells packages of login and session information
acquired from web browsers with a stealer malware.
Plati.Market Digital goods digital goods DWM
Rocketr Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Selly Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Shoppy.gg Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Skimmer Device Skimmer devices Marketplace selling skimmer devices
Tor Market Drugs Drug DWM focused on supplying the drug marketplace in New Zealand
Torrez Mixed Torrez is a multivendor market that uses wallet-less payments.
Venus Anonymous Mixed Multivendor DWM selling digital goods and drugs
White House Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency DWM
Wilhaben Mixed German language DWM for the sale of illicit goods
Yellow Brick Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency DWM
Table 8 COVID-19 related medicines appearing in the listings, together with a brief description and
the number of listings related to that drug
Medicine Description Listings
Hydroxychloroquine Malaria medication 65
Azitrhomycin Antibiotic often paired with hydroxychloroquine 51
Amoxicillin Antibiotic medication 45
Chloroquine Malaria medication 38
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic medication 6
Favipiravir Antiviral medication used to treat influenza 5
Dxycycline Antibiotic medication 4
Metronidazole Antibiotic medication 4
Remdesivir Antiviral medication 2
Lopiravir Antiviral medication used to treat HIV 1
after the Cares act was introduced in USA [80]. Other peaks coincide to the extension of
the SBA loan program in July [81] and to the failing of negotiations on the Heroes act [82],
after which the number of listings decreased up to April levels. Listings in the guides on
scamming category teach people how to take advantage of several kinds of COVID-19 re-
lief funds, or other pandemic related scam opportunities. In many western countries, new
relief funds were signed on a monthly basis constant updates made on the relative listings
on DWMs.
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Table 9 COVID-19 related guides on scamming appearing in the listings, together with a brief
description and the number of listings related to that sub-category
Topic Description Listings
SBA loan how to illicitly get money from the USA Small Business Loan program [81] 19
Bank account how to exploit pandemic related security to open bank accounts 16
Fraud Pack pack containing multiple generic covid related frauds 7
Covid-19 Generic guides explaining how to exploit the pandemic in many different ways 7
Amazon Amazon related fraud guides 6
GoFundMe GoFundMe related fraud guides 4
Apple Apple related fraud guides 3
Unemployment fund How to illicilty get money from government unemployment funds 3
Other Other COVID-19 related fraud guides 34
Figure 7 Probability distribution function (Pdf ) for
the number of listings per vendor. The power law fit
results in an exponent of –2.3. In inset, the histogram
of the number of listings per vendor, with a vertical
line showing the 80th percentile
Figure 8 Time evolution of the active COVID-19 specific listings in the guides on scamming category.
(a) Seven-days rolling average of these observed listings at a given time. Black dashed vertical lines
corresponded to significant COVID-19 world events, see Appendix C. (b) Seven-days median price with 95%
confidence interval for these observed listings
In order to complement Fig. 5(a) and (b) in the main text and properly show the peaks of
Wikipedia page visits and tweets, we create Fig. 9. The new representation of Fig. 5 does
not modify the claims made in the main text and how major event related with COVID-19
impacted public attention.
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Figure 9 Wikipedia page visits for pages relative to (a) PPE, (b) hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine and
azitrhomycin. Number of tweets mentioning (c) PPE, (d) hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine and azitrhomycin.
Panels (a) and (b) corresponds to Fig. 5(a) in the main text, while panels (c) and (d) to Fig. 5(b). The main
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